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The paper investigates differences in total consumption and demand according to how
heterogeneity is incorporated into the model of the general equilibrium type. The sensi-
tivity analysis for a static case with CES utilities and production functions demonstrates
that the relative differences in total consumption can be considerable when a model with
several heterogeneous consumer groups is compared to the one with a representative con-
sumer. In a dynamic model, investment is proved to depend both on the production and
consumption sides even in the case with one-sector production. By using the first-order
optimality conditions to the multi-sector case it is shown that a model has enough ca-
pability to represent household heterogeneity to be applied for integrated assessment of
carbon cycle emissions and energy demand.
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Introduction
Change in demographic factors such as age, urbanization, and household size has a con-
siderable impact on consumption, energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions (Dalton et
al., 2007, 2008). However, it is unclear when and how much compositional change might
affect aggregate consumption and energy demand. The research question of the present
paper is to investigate when total consumption of energy intensive goods differs according
to how heterogeneity is incorporated into the model.
Most energy-economic dynamic models used for climate change policy analysis have
either the representative household or overlapping generations structure (Howarth 1996,
Manne 1999, Gerald and Zwaan, 2000, Leach 2004). The PET-model adopted by Dalton
et al. (2007, 2008) was the first one to account for heterogeneity through grouping the
households (for a brief description see Appendix A). Our goal is to use a simpler model,
with similar key features to the PET-model, to get insights into why and under what
conditions the total consumption of several heterogeneous agents differs from consumption
of the representative consumer.
To start with simplest case first, Section 1 deals with the one-period static model in
both exchange and production economies. First, we review conditions for aggregation
of consumption and uniqueness of the equilibrium. Then we show through a series of
numerical experiments with CES-type productions functions and utilities that the unique
equilibrium in the heterogenous case is indeed different from the one of the representative
consumer. Possible reasons for these differences are discussed.
In Section 2, we consider a dynamic general equilibrium model with autonomous multi-
sector production and time-additive preferences with a common discount factor. Applying
the welfare theorems (Debreu, 1954; Prescott and Lucas, 1972), we relate an equilibrium
to the Pareto optimum, and prove the uniqueness of the latter using the dynamic pro-
gramming approach (Stokey and Lucas, 1987). Contrary to the conclusion of Lucas and
Stokey (1984), we show that even in the one-sector case investment depends on both pro-
duction and consumption sides. Using the first order conditions, we demonstrate that
it is even more dependent in the multi-sector case. A similar analysis of equilibria and
Pareto optimum in the multi-sector case with a different production correspondence and
more general recursive preferences has been done by Dana and Le Van (1990, 1991). Our
production is similar to the one used in PET, thus the results of the present paper sug-
gest that potentially the PET model can exhibit a heterogeneity effect. Further work is
underway to carry out a sensitivity analysis, similar to the one we do in the static case,
with the PET model to investigate the factors that add to the heterogeneity most.
1
1 One-period static models
1.1 Pure exchange economy
In an exchange economy, we define the notion of the market equilibrium and overview the
conditions when (a) exact aggregation is possible, and (b) the equilibrium is unique.
Consider an economy with I > 1 consumers; each solves the problem
max
xi≥0
ui(xi) s.t.
p · xi = p · wi,
where prices p = (p1, . . . , pL)≫ 0, i.e. pi > 0, all i, and donations w
i = (wi1, . . . , w
i
L) > 0
of L goods, i.e. wi ≥ 0, all i, and w ̸= 0, are given. Dot stands for the Euclidean scalar
product: p · x =
∑L
j=1 pjxj .
Consider an individual demand xi(p,mi) as a function of the given price vector p and
wealth mi ≡ p · wi. Define the aggregate demand x ≡
∑
i x
i(p,mi) and aggregate wealth
m ≡
∑
im
i. We point out two obvious properties. First is the homogeneity of degree
zero: x(λp, λm) = x(p,m), λ > 0, and second is Walras’s law: p · (x(p,m)− w) = 0.
When can the aggregate demand be expressed as a function of prices and the aggregate
wealth only: ∑
i
xi(p,mi) = x(p,m), (1)
for all possible individual wealth distributions? The answer is a well-known
Proposition Aggregate demand is a function of prices and the aggregate wealth if and
only if the individual demands are linear functions of wealth with a common slope, i.e.
relation (1) holds for all mi > 0, m ≡
∑
im
i, if and only if
xi(p,mi) = ai(p) + b(p)mi. (2)
Proof. The aggregate demand is a function of prices and aggregate wealth if and only if
dx = 0 for all m such that dm = 0, i.e.
∑
i
∂xi(p,mi)
∂mi
dmi = 0,
∑
i
dmi = 0.
The latter is true if and only if
∂xi(p,mi)
∂mi
= b(p).
Sufficient conditions, meaningful from the economics point of view, are as follows.
Corollary [Gorman, 1953] If the individual utilities are identical ui(x) = u(x), and
u(x) is homogeneous of degree one, then the condition (2) is fulfilled. Moreover, the
aggregate demand x(p,m) coincides with the solution to the utility u(x) maximization
problem given the values m and p.
Lemma 1. If the utility u(x) is homogeneous of degree one then the indirect utility function
is linear in wealth: v(p,m) = v˜(p)m.
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Proof of the lemma. From the definition of the indirect utility function, we easily obtain
v(p,m) = max
x
{u(x) : p · x ≤ m, x ≥ 0}
= max
x
{mu(x/m) : p · (x/m) ≤ 1, (x/m) ≥ 0}
= m max
ξ
{u(ξ) : p · ξ ≤ 1, ξ ≥ 0} = mv˜(p).
Proof of the corollary. From the above lemma, we have vi(p,m) = v(p,m) = v˜(p)m.
Roy’s identity (see, e.g., Mas-Collel et. al (1995)) yields
xi(p,mi) =
(
∂v(p,mi)
∂p
)/(
∂v(p,mi)
∂mi
)
=
(
1
v˜(p)
)
∂v˜(p)
∂p
mi =
∂ (log v˜(p))
∂p
mi.
Remark The result of the corollary remains valid for any homothetic preference given by
the utility function u(x) = f(ϕ(x)), where f is monotone increasing and positive, and ϕ
is homogeneous of degree 1.
As long as the distribution of initial endowment vectors is unrestricted, homothetic-
ity of individual preferences alone imposes no restrictions on aggregate behavior. More
precisely
Theorem [Mantel, 1976] Let f(p) be a twice differentiable function defined on a com-
pact convex subset of the price simplex. Suppose that the second derivatives of f(p) are
uniformly bounded and f(p) satisfies Walras’ law. Then there exists a collection of agents,
each endowed with a strictly concave, homogeneous utility function—and thus homothetic
preferences—such that the aggregate excess demand function x(p) coincides with f(p).
However, if the individual wealth distribution is fixed, i.e. independent of prices and
net wealth, then we have the following
Theorem [Eisenberg, 1961] Let the individual utilities ui(x) be homogeneous of degree
one, and mi = αim,
∑
i α
i = 1, 0 < αi < 1, then
∑
i x
i(p,mi) = x(p,m). Moreover,
x(p,m) can be obtained through the utility
∑
im
i log ui with p and m given.
Remark The condition mi = αim,
∑
i α
i = 1, 0 < αi < 1, is clearly satisfied if the
endowments themselves are collinear: wi = αiw. Since the wealth distribution is price
independent, the two conditions are equivalent. For a regular economy with at least three
goods: L > 2, a complementary result is true.
Theorem [Polemarchakis, 1983] Under the assumption that agents are endowed with
a fixed share of the aggregate endowment vector, homotheticity of preferences is necessary,
as well as sufficient, for aggregation.
Definition 1. The equilibrium in the exchange economy is the tuple (p, x1, · · · , xI) such
that the excess demand is zero:1
X(p) ≡
∑
i
xi(p)−
∑
i
wi = 0.
Existence is due to Arrow-Debreu, under pretty mild conditions. The most important
is that sets {x : ui(x) ≥ c} must be convex.
1If there is one consumer, then the equilibrium price vector is undefined.
3
A sufficient condition for uniqueness here is the gross substitutability condition (GS)
of the excess demand function:
∂Xk
∂pl
> 0, k ̸= l, k, l = 1, L, p≫ 0.
For CES utility: ui(xi) = (
∑
l al(x
i
l)
ρ)1/ρ, it is straightforward to check that xi(p) satisfies
GS if 0 < ρ < 1. Since GS property aggregates from individual consumer’s xi(p) to X(p),
the equilibrium in the exchange economy with ui of CES type and 0 < ρi < 1 is unique.
A necessary condition for uniqueness is the weak axiom of revealed preference (WA):
∑
ll′
ξl
∂Xl
∂pl′
ξl′ ≤ 0 for all ξ s.t. ξ ·X = 0,
where ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξL). WA is also “almost always” sufficient. Namely, it guarantees
that the set of equilibria is convex. Convexity yields uniqueness of the equilibrium for a
regular economy. Usually it can be shown that a generic economy is regular (Kehoe, 1991).
Therefore, one should not bother about the non-regular ones except for a situation when
a whole family of economies is considered depending continuously on a set of parameters,
say endowments. In this case one can inevitably pass through a non-regular economy as
parameters change.
Most important, WA is clearly satisfied in the case when there is only one consumer,
i.e. roughly aggregation implies uniqueness. Unlike GS, in general WA does not aggregate
from individual excess demand functions. It it is easy to show that in general WA does
not imply GS. However, there is one exceptional case of the two good economy when GS
and WA are equivalent [Kehoe, Mas-Colell, 1984].
Recent studies (Codenotti et al., 2005) showed that the equilibrium in the exchange
economy is unique if ui-s are of CES type with −1 < ρi < 0 (also true for nested CES).
Furthermore, the above authors proved that this is a polynomial-time problem Scarf’s
algorithms lacked this property (see Kehoe, (1991)). For ρi < −1, Gjerstad (1996) proved
that there can be multiple equilibria for consumers with arbitrarily close preferences.
Note that the total consumption
∑
xil of the l-th good is independent of consumer’s
individual consumption choices and is equal to the net donation
∑
iw
i
l , which is exogenous.
Thus, the equilibrium in the exchange economy is rather a welfare issue. To allow the
total consumption to change with prices, we need to consider the closed-loop system with
production.
1.2 Economy with production
In the economy with production, the same as before, we define the notion of the mar-
ket equilibrium and overview the conditions for exact aggregation and uniqueness of the
equilibrium.
Let there be J producers, each transforms an M -tuple of production factors z to an
amount fj(z) of jth consumer good. Assume that production factors are not consumed
and thus do not enter consumers utilities. Then market equilibrium is described as follows.
• The j-th producer maximizes the profit taking material prices q and output prices
p as given:
max
zj≥0
(pj fj(zj)− q · zj) = 0, (3)
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under the assumption of constant returns to scale.2 Optimality conditions yield
pj ∇fj(zj) = q
(J ·M relations for all producers).
• Materials are initially owned by consumers in the form of donations wi, so that∑
j
zj =
∑
i
wi (4)
(M relations).
• The i-th consumer maximizes utility:
max
xi≥0
ui(xi) s.t.
p · xi = q · wi.
(5)
(Optimality conditions give J · I relations.) Constant returns imply zero profits at
the equilibrium. Thus, the production ownership shares 0 < θij < 1,
∑
i θij = 1,
used in the general case (see, e.g., Mas-Collel et. al (1995)), are irrelevant here.
• Supply equals demand:
fj =
∑
i
xij , j = 1, J (6)
(J relations).
In the end, we have a nonlinear system of J(M + I + 1) +M equations and the same
number of variables (the dimension of the system can be reduced by one if we normalize
the prices, e.g. take one of the prices as a numeraire). Given the endowments w1,. . . ,wI ,
an equilibrium is the tuple (p, q, x1, . . . , xI , z1, . . . , zM ) satisfying (3)–(6).
It is readily seen that, once the prices are given, the production does not depend
explicitly on individual consumers distributions of materials as well as consumption shares,
but only on the net resources. Similarly, an individual’s consumption does not depend
explicitly on the distribution of material use, but only on the individual wealth. However,
production and consumption are implicitly linked through prices.
Suppose now that the consumers have identical homogeneous preferences or collinear
endowments. Then one aggregate consumer can be considered instead. The last three
equilibrium conditions (4)–(6) can be then rewritten as follows.
• The aggregate consumer maximizes utility:
max
x≥0
u(x) s.t.
p · x = q · w,
(optimality conditions give J relations).
2This yields that the production set
Y = {(−z, y) ∈ RM+J+ : fj(zj)− yj ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , J, z =
∑
j
zj}
is a cone.
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• Supply equals demand: ∑
j
zj = w, fj = xj , j = 1, J
(J +M relations).
An equilibrium (p, q, x, z1, . . . , zJ) is now the solution to the nonlinear system of J(M+
2) +M equations.
Note that, when the endowments wi are collinear, the consumption side (5) can be
always replaced by one consumer with the utility u =
∑
i(q · w
i) log ui. However, the
utility then depends on the prices q of the production factors.
GS is not a sufficient condition for uniqueness in the production economy any more.
However, WA is still a necessary condition, and the equilibrium with one consumer is
unique in a regular economy analogously to the pure exchange case. Thus in either Gor-
man (identical homothetic preferences) or Eisenberg (collinear endowments) case, we can
obtain the same unique equilibrium with the aggregate consumer. In general this is al-
most the only meaningful case of unique equilibrium in the economy with (homogeneous)
production. Another one applies when the equilibrium is fully defined by the production
sector (Kehoe, 1983), and thus of less interest for us. Mas-Colell (1989) introduced a class
of super Cobb-Douglas economies with restrictions on both production and consumption
for which he proved uniqueness (see Kehoe, 1991). This includes (nested) CES case with
0 < ρi < 1. In the particular case of homogeneous utilities, Jain et al, (2005) obtained
uniqueness results for (nested) CES with −1 ≤ ρi ≤ 0, and provided poly-time algorithms.
The bottom line here is that there are two cases when exact aggregation applies:
either identical homothetic preferences and arbitrary endowments or collinear endowments
with different homothetic preferences. Then there exists a unique equilibrium under mild
concavity assumptions. Aside of those, uniqueness results have been proven for economies
with (possibly nested) CES production and utility functions when the absolute value of
the elasticity of substitution is less or equal than one (excluding the linear case).
1.3 Sensitivity analysis in a two good production economy
As we have seen, the conditions for exact aggregation are very stringent. In this section,
we compare the total consumption of two heterogeneous consumers with consumption of
the representative consumer when those assumptions are not fulfilled. The production
side is kept the same in both cases.
Consider a static production economy with two consumers (I = 2) and two consumer
goods (J = 2). Consumers’ utility is assumed to be of CES type:
u1(x1, x2) = (ax
ρ
1 + (1− a)x
ρ
2)
1/ρ, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
u2(y1, y2) = (by
σ
1 + (1− b)y
σ
2 )
1/σ, 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
Define the utility of the representative consumer as follows:
u(z1, z2) = (cz
γ
1 + (1− c)z
γ
2 )
1/γ ,
where the coefficients c and γ are set to be the averages of the ones for the heterogeneous
consumers:
c =
1
2
(a+ b), γ =
1
2
(ρ+ σ). (7)
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There are two production factors owned by the consumers. The endowments of the
first and the second consumers are set to be (w1, 0) and (0, w2) respectively, so that
the aggregate endowment is w = (w1, w2). Thus, the 1st consumer solves the following
optimization problems:
u1(x1, x2)→ max, p1x1 + p2x2 = q1w1, (8)
and the 2nd consumer solves the following one:
u2(y1, y2)→ max, p1y1 + p2y2 = q2w2. (9)
One can think of the 1st consumer as “younger households” and of the 2nd as “elderly
households”, and label factors of production as “labor” and “capital”. Then the above
assumption on endowments describe an idealized situation where the “younger households”
own all of the labor, while the “elderly households” all of the capital.
Each consumption good is supplied by one producer with the CES production function:
f1(z1, z2) = (kz
δ
1 + (1− k)z
δ
2)
1/δ, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1,
f2(v1, v2) = (lv
δ
1 + (1− l)v
δ
2)
1/δ, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1,
(10)
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the common substitution coefficient. The producers’ profit maximiza-
tion problems read
p1f1(z1, z2)− q1z1 − q2z2 → max,
p2f2(v1, v2)− q1v1 − q2v2 → max .
(11)
Supply-equals-demand conditions are
z1 + v1 = w1, z2 + v2 = w2, (12)
x1 + y1 = f1, x2 + y2 = f2. (13)
We make a sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium total consumptions of the 1st good
x1 + y1 and 2nd good x2 + y2 with respect to (i) preference coefficients a and b, and (ii)
substitution coefficients ρ and σ. In both cases, we fix k = 0.9 and l = 0.1 to make the
production asymmetric in the demand for production factors, i.e. the first sector is “labor
intensive” and the other one is “capital intensive”. We normalize the endowments so that
their product is constant and equal to unity: w1 = d and w2 = 1/d, which is equivalent
to normalizing the total endowment (sum) of the goods to unity. This implies that it is
sufficient to consider only 0 < d ≤ 1. Indeed, the case 1 ≤ d reduces to the previous one
by relabeling z1 to z2 and v1 to v2, respectively.
First, we set ρ and σ to be equal, and consider the parametrization b = 1−a, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
Clearly, in this case the average preference (7) is constant, so that the equilibrium of the
representative consumer is independent of a. At a = 0.5 the utilities are identical, and
thus the disaggregated equilibrium coincides with the one of the representative consumer.
Note that, if the endowments of the two goods are equal: d = 1, the disaggregated
equilibrium coincide with the aggregated one for all a. Indeed, with b = 1 − a, we have
u1(x1, x2) = u2(x2, x1), all a, and the endowments are also symmetric. Thus, with the
transform
x1 ↔ y2, x2 ↔ y1, p1 ↔ p2, q1 ↔ q2 (14)
the optimization problem (8) maps into (9) and vice versa. Due to (13), the values of the
output f1 and f2 must also change places. Since l = 1− k in (10), the swap f1 ↔ f2 can
be achieved by the transform
z1 ↔ v2, z2 ↔ v1. (15)
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Therefore, if (x1, x2, y1, y2) are the equilibrium consumptions, (z1, z2, v1, v2) are the equi-
librium inputs, and (q1, q2, p1, p2) are the equilibrium prices, then the tuples (y2, y1, x2, x1),
(v2, v1, z2, z1) and (q2, q1, p2, p1) also form an equilibrium. Due to uniqueness, the two must
coincide, and thus, at the equilibrium with d = 1, we have
x1 = y2, x2 = y1, z1 = v2, z2 = v1, p1 = p2 = p, q1 = q2 = q.
This yields that the total consumption of both goods are constant and equal to each
other, all a and b = 1 − a. However, in general, when the endowments of the two goods
are different, the relative equilibrium values of the total consumptions differ from the ones
of the representative consumer at a ̸= 0.5 as well (see Figures 1–2).
Second, we set a = b = 0.5, and consider the parametrization σ = 1 − ρ, all 0 ≤
ρ ≤ 1. Again, the average substitution (7) is constant, so that the equilibrium of the
representative consumer is independent of ρ. At ρ = 0.5 the utilities are identical, and
thus the disaggregated equilibrium coincides with the one of the representative consumer.
As in the previous case, if the endowments of the two goods are equal: d = 1, the
disaggregated equilibrium coincide with the aggregated one for all ρ. Indeed, in that
case ui(x1, x2) = ui(x2, x1), i = 1, 2, imply x1 = x2 = x and y1 = y2 = y, so that the
total consumption of the both goods is equal to x + y. Figure 3 shows that, same as in
the previous case, for nonequal endowments of the two goods and ρ ̸= 0.5, the relative
equilibrium values of the total consumptions differ from the ones of the representative
consumer.
From Figures 1–3 (top panel), we see that the consumption of the good that is more
dependant on a scarce resource is more sensitive, i.e. its relative change is greater. More-
over, when the substitution coefficient is positive, for a ∈ [0, 0.5] the relative change is
larger than for a ∈ [0.5, 1] (with negative substitution coefficient the opposite is observed).
One can try to describe the situation that corresponds to a ∈ [0, 0.5] as “consumers prefer
the opposite to what they own factors for”. For the prices of the consumer goods the
situation is the opposite (see the middle panel in Fig. 1–3). Namely, the price of the good
whose output depends on a more abundant resource has a larger relative change. Clearly
the magnitude of the both effects depend on the substitution factor (Fig. 1–2). Also, the
larger is the difference in the endowments, the larger are the relative changes (Fig. 3).
The bottom panel in Figures 1–3 shows the consumers’ wealth: p1x1+p2x2 and p1y1+
p2y2. One can see that wealth of the consumer that owns a larger endowment has a more
visible relative change. The relative change is larger for ρ ∈ [0.5, 1].
1.4 Economy with taxes and government spending
The PET-model includes government spending and various taxes, in particular a CO2-
emission tax. The notion of the equilibrium can be extended to this situation as well.
However, due to the externalities the connection between the equilibrium and Pareto
optimum in general fails, and already existence of the equilibrium poses a problem (Kehoe,
1991). Therefore, this paper is confined mainly to the models without taxes. Here we give
a brief account of the static economy with production and imperfect markets.
The equilibrium is the tuple (p, q, r, x1, . . . , xI , z1, . . . , zM ), where r is the amount of
government spending, such that the following conditions are satisfied.
• The j-th producer faces an ad valorem taxes τj on products and maximizes the
after-tax profit taking material prices q and output prices p as given:
max
zj≥0
(pj(1− τj) fj(zj)− q · zj) = 0.
8
• The i-th consumer maximizes utility with a modified budget constraint:
max
xi≥0
ui(xi) s.t.∑
j
pj · x
i
j =
∑
m
qm(1− tm)w
i
m + γir.
Here tm is the ad valorem tax on the material good m and γi ≥ 0,
∑
i γi = 1, is the
share of government revenue r received by the consumers i.
• Supply equals demand conditions:∑
j
zj =
∑
i
wi, fj =
∑
i
xij , j = 1, J.
Walras’s law takes the form∑
j
pjτjfj +
∑
m
qmtmwm = r.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium can be studied using the index theory along the lines of
Kehoe (1983, 1985). Two remarks are in place here. First, as was shown by Kehoe (1985),
in the economy with the Leontieff production sector even the WA can be insufficient for
the uniqueness. Second, as often happens in the economies with taxes and externalities,
the equilibrium can be not Pareto optimal.
2 Dynamic general equilibrium model
2.1 Consumption
Consider a finite number of infinitely lived agents indexed by i = 1, n. Each agent’s
consumption ci is a sequence ci = {cit}
∞
t=1. Consumption goods are indexed by j = 1,m,
so that each time cit is a vector cit = (ci1t, . . . , cimt). Consumptions are nonnegative and
uniformly bounded, i.e. each ci is an elements of l
m
+ , the nonnegative orthant of l
m
∞, with
the norm
∥ci∥ = sup
j,t
|cijt|.
Remark 1. The choice of l∞ is an important technical requirement. It is easy to check
that the positive orthant of spaces lp, 1 ≤ p <∞, and of the spaces {x :
∑
t β
t|xt| <∞},
0 < β < 1, has no interior points. Nonempty interior allows to apply the Hahn-Banach
separation theorem. Following L&S (1984), we omit the infinity subscript in the notation.
The preference of an agent at time t is given by the single-period utility function U(ct)
(index i is omitted here), and the overall preference has the time-additive form:
u(c) =
∑
t
βtU(ct), 0 < β < 1.
Definition 2. The utility function u is strictly concave if c, c′ ∈ lm+ and u(c) > u(c
′) imply
u(θc+ (1− θ)c′) > u(c′) for all θ ∈ (0, 1).
Let U be (strictly) concave and bounded, so that u is well-defined, i.e.
∥u∥ = sup
c
|u(c)| <∞.
Given c = (c1, c2, . . . ), denote c
T = (c1, . . . , cT , 0, . . . ).
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Lemma 1 (Truncation property in consumption). If c, c′ ∈ lm+ and u(c) > u(c
′), then
u(cT ) > u(c′), for all T sufficiently large.
Proof. Indeed, for every c ∈ l+, we have u(c) = limT→∞ u(c
T ).
To secure non-zero capital shares over the the whole time span a common time prefer-
ence coefficient β must be taken for all consumers (Coles, 1986, Lucas & Stokey 1984 and
Becker, 2006). Further on we will need the following
Definition 3. The consumption c ∈ l+ is a saturation point if c
′ ∈ l+ implies u(c
′) ≤ u(c).
2.2 Production
There is a multi-sector one capital production. Each consumption good is produced by one
producer. The capital sequence k = {kt}
∞
t=1 is assumed to be non-negative and bounded:
k ∈ l+ with the norm ∥k∥ = supt |kt|. The technology is assumed to be stationary, i.e.
each time the admissible total consumption ct, investment xt and the next time capital
kt+1 are determined by the current capital kt only. Denote the set of all admissible tuples
(ct, kt+1) as Γ(kt), so that the technology is described by the production correspondence
(set-valued map) Γ : R+ → R
m
+ ×R+ ×R+. The production correspondence Γ is assumed
to be continuous and have the following properties (for discussion see L&S, 1984):
(G1) for each k, the set Γ(k) is compact and convex;
(G2) (c, x, y) ∈ Γ(k) and 0 ≤ (c′, y′) ≤ (c, y) imply (c′, y′) ∈ Γ(k);
(G3) k′ ≤ k implies Γ(k′) ∈ Γ(k);
(G4) (c, y) ∈ Γ(k) and (c′, y′) ∈ Γ(k′) imply
(θc+ (1− θ)c′, θy + (1− θ)y′) ∈ Γ(θk + (1− θ)k′)
for all θ ∈ [0, 1];
(G5) the set M ≡ {k ∈ R+ : (0, k) ∈ Γ(k)} has a nonempty interior;
(G6) if k is an interior point of M , then (c, k) ∈ Γ(k) for some c≫ 0.
Given the initial capital k0, the set of all admissible consumption sequences is defined
as follows:
Y (k0) ≡ {c : ∃ k ∈ l+ s.t. (ct, kt+1) ∈ Γ(kt) ∀ t = 0, 1, 2, . . . }. (16)
Lemma 2 (L&S, 1984). Let the production correspondence Γ satisfy the assumptions
(G1)–(G6) and let the production set be defined by (16). Then for each k0 the set Y (k0) is
closed and convex, and if k0 is an interior point of M , Y (k0) has an nonempty interior.
3
Note that in the Stokey-Lucas setup the production set consists of the output only,
not (c, x,−k) as it should in the classical Arrow-Debreu theory. Due to this difference
just free disposal assumption is insufficient to provide a nonempty interior, as in Debreu
(1954). Only assumptions (G2),(G5) and (G6) together guarantee nonempty interior in
the Lucas setting. Assumption (G2) also yields the following
Lemma 3 (Truncation property in production). Given k0, c ∈ Y (k0) implies c
T ∈ Y (k0)
for all T sufficiently large.
3Y (k0) is not compact in the sup-norm, but compact in the product topology due to Tikhonov theorem
(see Dana and Le Van, 1990).
10
2.3 Equilibrium and Pareto optimum
Following Debreu (1954) and L&S (1984), we give the following definitions.
Definition 4. Given the initial capital k0, an allocation (ci) ∈ l
mn
+ is feasible if c¯ =∑
i ci ∈ Y (k0).
Definition 5. The price system is an m-tuple p ∈ lm+ such that p · c =
∑
jt pjtcjt <∞ for
all c ∈ lm+ .
Definition 6. Given k0, a competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation (ci) together
with the price system p such that
(i) p · c′i ≤ p · ci implies u
i(c′i) ≤ u
i(ci) for all i and for all (c
′
i) ∈ l
mn
+ ;
(ii) p · c¯′ ≤ p · c¯ for all c¯′ ∈ Y (k0).
Definition 7. Given k0, an allocation (ci) is Pareto optimum if it is feasible, and there
is no other feasible allocation (c′i) such that (c
′
i) > (ci), i.e.
ui(c′i) ≥ u
i(ci) for all i,
and
ui(c′i) > u
i(ci) for some i.
Due to Debreu, 1954 and Stokey and Lucas, 1987, 1987, we have the following
Theorem 1 (First Welfare Theorem). Suppose for each i, the utility ui : lm+ → R+ is
strictly convex. Let (ci, p) be a competitive equilibrium, where none of the ci is a saturation
point. Then (ci) is a Pareto-optimum allocation.
Proof. The proof closely follows the one of Debreu (1954). First, ui(c′i) > u(ci) implies
p ·c′i > p ·ci. This follows directly from condition (i) of Definition 6. Second, u
i(c′i) = u(ci)
implies p · c′i ≥ p · ci. This is a consequence of strict convexity of u
i. Now, let (c′i) > (ci)
then
∑
i p ·c
′
i >
∑
i p ·ci, or equivalently, p · c¯
′ = p ·
∑
i c
′
i > p ·
∑
i ci = p · c¯. This contradicts
to condition (ii) of Definition 6.
S&L, 1987 replace the strong convexity assumption by a similar one: for every c ∈ l+
there exists a sequence {c(n)} ⊂ l+ such that c(n) → c and u
i(c(n)) > u
i(c), all i.
The converse statement says that the supporting price system for the optimum allo-
cation can be constructed (Prescott & Lucas, 1982). This theorem requires additional
convexity and interior point assumptions, since the argument draws on the Hahn-Banach
Theorem (see KF and Luenberger, 1969). The truncation property (Theorem 1) guaran-
tees that the linear functional in the Hahn-Banach theorem represents a price system and
does not have “weight at infinity”, i.e. the functional belongs to lm1 .
Theorem 2 (Second Welfare Theorem). Suppose for each i, the utility ui : lm+ → R+
is strictly convex. Let assumptions (G1)–(G6) be satisfied, let (ci) be a Pareto-optimal
allocation, given k0, and assume that some ci is not a saturation point. Then there exists
a price system p such that
(i) ui(c′i) ≤ u
i(ci) implies p · c
′
i ≤ p · ci for all i and for all (c
′
i) ∈ l
mn
+ ;
(ii) p · c¯′ ≤ p · c¯ for all c¯′ ∈ Y (k0).
Remark 2. Condition (i) in Theorem 2 coincides with the one in Definition 6 if none of
the ci is a corner solution, i.e. there exists c
′
i ∈ l+ such that u
i(c′i) < u
i(ci), all i.
The two welfare theorems enables us to study a Pareto-optimum instead of an equi-
librium (including the questions of existence and uniqueness).
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2.4 Value function
Define the set of all possible utility combinations, given the value of the capital k ∈ R+ in
the current period:
Z(k) = {z ∈ Rn+ : zi = u
i(ci), i = 1, n, for some feasible (ci) ∈ l
mn
+ }.
Lemma 4 (Stokey and Lucas, 1984). Given k, the set Z(k) is convex and compact, and
possesses the “free disposal” property: 0 < z′ < z and z ∈ Z(k) imply z′ ∈ Z(k). Moreover,
the correspondence k → Z(k) is continuous.
The ordering on consumption space l+ corresponds to the usual ordering on R
m
+ : given
z, z′ ∈ Z(k), the relation z′ ≤ z is equivalent to z′i ≤ zi, all i. The “north-western
boundary” of the set Z(k) corresponds to Pareto-optimum allocations. More precisely,
given k, an allocation (ci) is Pareto-optimal if and only if the point z = (u
1(c1), . . . , u
n(cn))
is the unique intersection point of the set Z(k) with the shifted non-negative orthant
{z}+Rn+. This allows to reduce the search for Pareto-optimal allocations to a maximization
problem.
Given the vector θ that belongs to the unit simplex ∆n−1 = {θ ∈ Rn+ :
∑
i θi = 1},
define the value function as the support function of the set Z(k):
v(k, θ) ≡ sup
z∈Z(k)
∑
i
θizi. (17)
As a consequence of lemma 4 the supremum in (17) can be replaced by maximum.
Lemma 5. Given k, the allocation (ci) is Pareto-optimal if and only if there exists a
nonnegative vector θ ∈ Rn+ such that (ci) attains supremum in (17).
Proof. Both Z(k) and {z} + Rn+ are convex sets in R
n. Hence there exits a separating
hypersurface {w ∈ Rn :
∑
i θi(wi − zi) = 0} such that
∑
i θiz
′
i ≤
∑
i θizi for all z
′ ∈ Z(k),
and
∑
i θiwi ≥ 0 for all w ∈ R
n
+. The latter yields θi ≥ 0, all i.
From Lemma 4 we immediately obtain
Lemma 6. The value function v(k, θ) is bounded and continuous.
2.5 Optimality principle
Next we show that the value function v(k, θ) is the unique solution to the Bellman equation
V (k, θ) = max
(c¯,y)∈Γ(k)
(∑
i
θiUi(ci) + βV (y, θ)
)
. (18)
In the case when β’s are different, the Bellman equation generalizes as follows:
V (k, θ) = max
(c¯,y)∈Γ(k)
w≥0
∑
i
θi(Ui(ci) + βiwi) s.t.
min
λ∈∆n−1
V (y, λ) ≥ λ · w.
In this case, λ is the next step guess for the weights θ.
Lemma 7. Bellman equation (18) has the unique solution V (k, θ). This function V (k, θ)
is increasing and (strictly) concave in k, and convex in θ.
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Proof. Standard reasoning (e.g. S&L, 1989). Define the operator
Tf(k, θ) = max
(c¯,y)∈Γ(k)
(∑
i
θiUi(ci) + βf(k, θ)
)
.
on the space B of all bounded and continuous functions over R+×∆
n−1. Since Γ is compact
and f is continuous, Tf is correctly defined (maximum is attained) and bounded; since
Γ and f are continuous, so is Tf . Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for contraction are
satisfied:
f ≤ f˜ ⇒ Tf ≤ T f˜ , ∀ f, f˜ ∈ B.
and
T (f + a) ≤ Tf + βa, ∀ f ∈ B and ∀ a > 0.
Thus, there exist the unique fixed point V such that limn→∞ ∥Tf0−V ∥ = 0, for all f0 ∈ B.
The fact that V (k, θ) is increasing in k follows from (G3). If f is concave in k and
convex in θ, so is Tf . Indeed, let k ̸= k′, and (c, y) and (c′, y′) attain Γ(k) and Γ(k′),
respectively. By (G4), (cλ, yλ) ∈ Γ(kλ). From concavity of Ui it follows
(Tf)(kλ, θ) ≥
∑
i
θiUi(c
λ
i ) + βf(k
λ, θ)
≥ λ
[∑
i
θiUi(ci) + βf(k, θ)
]
+ (1− λ)
[∑
i
θiUi(c
′
i) + βf(k
′, θ)
]
= λ(Tf)(k, θ) + (1− λ)(Tf)(k′, θ)
(the second inequality is strict if Ui are strictly concave).
It is easy to show that v(k, θ) is the solution to (18). Given V (k, θ) the r.h.s. of equation
(18) determines the (non-empty and upper semi-continuous) solution correspondence G :
R+ → R
m
+ × R+ that maps k to (c, y) = (G
c(k), Gy(k)). If Γ(k) and Ui, all i, are strictly
convex, then so is V (k, θ). Once V (k, θ) is strictly convex in k, G is single-valued and
continuous.
2.6 Dynamics
Next we investigate the dependence of the trajectory (c, y) = (Gc(k), Gy(k)) on the pa-
rameter θ. To do that we need to impose additional smoothness assumption on both pro-
duction functions and utilities, and the Inada condition on utilities: limcj→0 Ui,j(c) =∞.
2.6.1 One-sector case
In the one-sector case, the constraint (c¯, y) ∈ Γ(k) can be replaced by a simpler one:
0 ≤ c¯ ≤ F (k, y), where the function F : R+ × R+ → R
m
+ is defined as
F (k, y) = max
(c,y)∈Γ(k)
c.
Lemma 8 (L&S, 1984). Suppose F and Ui, i = 1, n differentiable. If θ ≫ 0 then for all
k ≥ 0 the function V (k, θ) is differentiable with
Vk(k, θ) = θiU
′
i(G
c
i (k, θ))Fk(k,G
y(k, θ)), i = 1, n. (19)
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The first order conditions for the r.h.s. of (18) are obtained from the Lagrange function4
L =
∑
i
θiUi(ci) + βV (y, θ) + λ
(
F (k, y)−
∑
i
ci
)
.
If all Ui satisfy the Inada condition, the inequality c ≥ 0 can be dismissed. Then the
interior solution is described by
0 = θiU
′
i(ci)− λ, i = 1, n, (20)
0 = βVk(y, θ) + λFy(k, y). (21)
Substituting (19) into (21) and rearranging, we come to
βU ′i(G
c
i (y, θ))Fk(y,G
k(y, θ)) + U ′i(G
c
i (k, θ))Fy(k, y) = 0, i = 1, n. (22)
In particular, for the standard one-sector model with F (k, y) = f(k) + (1 − δ)k − y,
we have
βU ′i(G
c
i (y, θ))(f
′(k) + (1− δ)) + U ′i(G
c
i (k, θ)) = 0, i = 1, n.
At the steady state equations (22) can be reduced to
(βFk + Fy)y=k = 0.
For example, for the standard one-sector model with F (k, y) = f(k) + (1 − δ)k − y, this
yields the “golden rule” steady state: β(f ′(k) + (1− δ))− 1 = 0.
2.6.2 Multi-sector case
The standard one-sector production correspondence
Γ(kt) ≡
{
(ct, kt+1) ∈ R
2
+ : ct + xt ≤ f(kt), kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xt
}
,
in the multi-sector case, can be generalized as follows:
Γ(kt) ≡


(ct, kt+1) ∈ R
m
+ × R+ :
cjt ≤ fj(kjt), j = 1,m,
xt ≤ fm+1(km+1t),
m+1∑
j=1
kjt = kt,
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xt


.
If the production functions fj are concave, then assumptions (G1)–(G6) are satisfied.
The Lagrange function takes the form:
L =
∑
i
θiUi(ci) + βV (y, θ) +
∑
j
λj ·
(
f(kj)−
∑
i
cij
)
+ λm+1(fm+1(km+1) + (1− δ)k − y) + ν

k − m+1∑
j
kj

 . (23)
4In the homogeneous case one can plug in c = F (k, y) directly into the utility function and solve the
unconstrained problem max{U(F (k, y)) + βV (y) : y ∈ G(k)}.
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The first order conditions are as follows:
0 = θiUi,j(ci)− λj , i = 1, n, j = 1,m (24)
0 = βVk(y, θ)− λm+1, (25)
0 = λjf
′
j(kj)− ν, j = 1,m+ 1. (26)
Eliminating λj from (25) and (26), we get
θiUi,j(ci)f
′
j(kj) = ν, i = 1, n, j = 1,m
and
βVk(y, θ)f
′
m+1(km+1) = ν.
Though the Pareto optimum is shown to be unique, the equilibrium might not be.
However, as in the static case (the same duality argument now in the Banach space), we
have
Theorem 3. The equilibrium is unique if the consumers have a common homothetic
preference.
In general, a regular (generic) economy has a finite number of equilibria (Kehoe, 1991).
3 Discussion
Numerical experiments done in Section 1 show that an equilibrium in a static model with
several heterogeneous consumers each having different CES utilities can differ substantially
from the one with a representative consumer having the CES utility with averaged pref-
erences, if preferences across consumers differ enough and endowments are not co-linear.
This conclusion applies equally to the case when the elasticities are averaged instead of
the preferences.
From section 2, we conclude that the transitional dynamics of the total consumption
depends on both the production side and individual preferences. The steady state equilib-
rium, if it exists, does not depend on the weights θ’s, which allows the turnpike property
under stronger assumptions (Bewley, 1982; Yano, 1982). Note that the PET model has
additional potential for representing heterogeneity as the labor supply and preference co-
efficients are time-dependent.
The work by Alvarez and Stokey (1998) suggests that our analysis can be extended to
the constant-returns-to-scale production. From the results surveyed in Section 1 it is then
natural to conjecture that restricting the production and consumption to CES type one
can prove uniqueness of the equilibrium in the dynamic model as well. This is important
for numerical calculations since iterative algorithms, like Gauss-Seidel method, are most
often applied.
A straightforward application of neither dynamic programming, nor welfare theorems
is possible for economies with taxes. Some ideas on dynamic model with taxes can be
found in Kehoe (1991).
Appendix A. PET model: synopsis
PET is a dynamic general equilibrium fully calibrated model, which accounts for het-
erogeneity through grouping the households (Dalton et al., 2008; Dalton and Goulder,
2001). To be specific, consider a version of the PET model that accounts for the age
15
heterogeneity. The households are grouped into dynasties indexed by i (see Appendix B).
Each dynasty owns the capital kit in per capita units, which is perfectly substitutable in
production. Households buy investment goods xit at price qt adding it to the capital stock,
which depreciate at the common rate δ > 0:
kit+1 = (1− δ)k
i
t + x
i
t. (27)
There are consumer goods indexed by j. Per capita consumption for a household in
dynasty i, of good j, at date t is denoted by cijt. The instantaneous budget constraint in
dynasty i is written as∑
j
pjtc
i
jt + qtx
i
t = (1− θ
i
t)wtl
i
t + (1− ϕ
i
t)rtk
i
t + g
i
t (28)
where lit is the labor supply, wt = 1 is wages (taken as a numeraire, by way of Walras’s
law) θit and ϕ
i
t are lump-sum tax rates (on labor and capital income), rt is the interest
rate, and git is the lump-sum transfers from the government.
Under the above mentioned constraints, each dynasty chooses its consumption {cijt},
for all j, and investment xit to maximize its lifetime utility
1
ρ
∞∑
t=1
βtnit

∑
j
µijt(c
i
jt)
σ


ρ
σ
, (29)
where 0 < β < 1 is a common discount factor, ρ < 1 is the intertemporal substitution
parameter, σ < 1 is the consumption substitution parameter, nit is the size of the dynasty
at time t, and µijt are preference parameters calibrated to the expenditure shares in the
base year. Households are assumed to take prices as given and have a perfect foresight of
future values of the variables, such as rt and qt, and future assets of other households. The
Euler equation can be obtained in closed form. Together with an imposed transversality
condition it provides a solution sequence.
Producers also take prices as given and assign their cost-minimizing production shares
according to a CES production function (we omit the index j here):
X = γX
(
αK(GKK)
ρX + αL(GLL)
ρX + αE¯(GE¯E¯)
ρX + αM (GMM)
ρX
)1/ρX
with capital K, labor L, energy composite E¯ and materials M as inputs. The technol-
ogy of government output is also represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function;
government’s purchases are constant in real terms.
The equilibrium is defined by market clearing conditions (supply equals demand) and
governmental budget. Equilibrium prices are determined iteratively under certain regu-
larity assumptions.
Appendix B. Dynasty approach
A dynasty is a chain of households representing different age groups: the elderly of age
ω, their descendants of age ω − τ , descendants of their descendants of age ω − 2τ , etc.
Once the period τ and the age resolution of o cohort L ≤ τ are fixed, there are N = τ/L
dynasties numbered by i. The grouping is assumed to be time consistent, i. e. members
of the dynasties do not mingle over time (ways to relax this assumption are discussed at
the end). Each dynasty maximizes its own intertemporal utility adapting accordingly its
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consumption and investment sequences. The principal purpose of arranging the model that
way is to investigate the impact of age and other forms of heterogeneity on consumption
and investment patterns.
The population nit of the dynasty, as well as its labor supply lit, are simply the total
population and work force of all contributing households. This data comes from household
projections and is available in advance for the the whole model run period (Dalton et al.,
2008).
Consumption preferences µijt of the dynasty i toward the good j are calculated as the
average of households’ preferences in the dynasty, weighted according to their population
share. This way the dynastic utility accounts for different consumption patterns of different
age groups.
The initial capital k0i is the weighted average of the statistical data on capital over
different age groups within the dynasty. Since generally the elderly have more capital
through savings, the initial capital of the dynasty will be greater than just the statisti-
cal capital of the youngest household. That serves as a proxy for the intergenerational
(bequest) transfers linking the oldest and youngest households. The latter was the main
obstacle in using the OLG type of models.5 The representative consumer framework is
obtained as a particular case with one dynasty. The values of nt, lt, µjt and k0 in this case
are clearly independent of L = τ .
In principal, an aging population has two major off-setting effects on capital. On the
one hand, the labor supply decreases, thus diminishing the capital. On the other hand,
elderly people have more capital saved during the previous years. According to the model
description, for each dynasty aging will result in (a) diminishing the labor force lit, (b)
shifting the consumption preference coefficients µijt, and (c) changing the value of the
initial capital k0i.
Note that adopting the above framework does not modify the structure of the dy-
nasty’s utility, say to incorporate the consumption of other members of the dynasty. As a
consequence, the fact that a member of one dynasty never becomes a member of another
one is not important any more. Thus, the same approach can be used to study the impact
of urbanization or household size. Grouping in general could be worthwhile if (a) there is
a shift in the category (e.g. aging, urbanization, etc.), and (b) data shows that preferences
vary considerably across the category.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium characteristics relative to their values at a = 0.5 in case with d = 10
and ρ = σ = −0.5 (left) and ρ = σ = 0.2 (right): total consumption of the 1st good (solid)
and 2nd good (dashed); price of the 1st good (solid) and 2nd good (dashed); wealth of the
1st household (solid) and 2nd household (dashed).
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Figure 2: Equilibrium characteristics relative to their values at a = 0.5 in case with d = 10
and ρ = σ = 0.5 (left) and ρ = σ = 0.8 (right): total consumption of the 1st good (solid)
and 2nd good (dashed); price of the 1st good (solid) and 2nd good (dashed); wealth of the
1st household (solid) and 2nd household (dashed).
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Figure 3: Equilibrium characteristics relative to their values at ρ = 0.5 in case with
a = b = 0.5, and d = 10 (left) and d = 20 (right): total consumption of the 1st good
(solid) and 2nd good (dashed); price of the 1st good (solid) and 2nd good (dashed); wealth
of the 1st household (solid) and 2nd household (dashed).
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